[P6: This is a seriously rare event: an anonymous comment (left over here) that I found detailed and interesting enough to promote to a post]
President George W. Bush issued a highly classified presidential finding in late 2007 approving the initiation of covert operations focused on “undermining Iran’s nuclear ambitions and trying to undermine the government through regime change,” according to a July 7 article in The New Yorker by Seymour Hersh. Congressional leaders reportedly have been informed of the finding, and approved up to $400 million dollars to fund the operation.
This is, of course, explosive news. What is explosive is not that the United States is spending money on covert operations in Iran, but that someone has leaked a highly classified document to a reporter. The secret is now out; indeed, it was released before the article’s publication date. Hersh said only that the person who gave him the information was familiar with the document’s contents. This means his source is a person with extraordinarily high, code-named clearance — not to mention a criminal.
We would expect the Bush administration to be launching multiple investigations to find the leaker. If he is a Republican or a member of the administration or the intelligence community, then massive damage control is essential. If he is a Democrat who leaked (or an official of an agency deemed unfriendly to the administration), the incident represents a political opportunity. Everyone who had access to that document should be attached to a polygraph right now. Washington should have been in turmoil all weekend.
It wasn’t. Aside from some desultory comments, no one seems terribly upset that a major covert operation has been uncovered in the press and thereby crippled.
We are certain that a journalist of Hersh’s stature, writing for a respected publication like The New Yorker, did not make his story up. Since arrests are not pending, we can only conclude that the information was deliberately leaked to Hersh by the administration. This would not be the first time Hersh has been used as a channel by administration leakers. In 2006, he reported that the administration was carrying out covert operations in Iran for roughly the same end. Hersh is not friendly to the administration to say the least. A story by him carries great credibility because it appears to be an authentic scoop by a major journalist revealing things the administration doesn’t want revealed. Such a story therefore increases the sense of uncertainty in Iran substantially more than if a minor, pro-administration journalist published it. As we have pointed out in the case of the Mediterranean air exercises by Israel, the United States and Israel are intent on increased th e psychological pressure on Iran. This story fits into that pattern.
The only thing interesting in the story is the idea that until late 2007 there had been no presidential finding and the United States was not engaged in covert operations in Iran to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program and foment regime change. Given the administration’s stance on Iran, it is unthinkable that the intelligence community would not have been running operations in Iran for years focused on just these things. Stratfor has regularly reported on various bombings in the southwestern Arab regions of Iran as well as in Sistan-Balochistan, noting that these would be likely areas to foment unrest.
The latest finding could be an intensification in operations, but the authorization to spend up to $400 million to mess with the Iranians is really not all that much money — especially since that is the cap, and the time frame for expenditures isn’t authorized. But as Hersh made clear in 2006, operations already were under way, meaning a finding had to have been in place.
With all due respect to Mr. Hersh and The New Yorker, this is a report on the obvious. The United States regards Iran as a major target for covert operations, urgently wants to know everything it can about Iran’s nuclear facilities and would love to overthrow the Iranian government. A few hundred million, even on a long shot, is the least the United States would throw at this. As for a finding in late 2007, we do not know where the bureaucratic process is right now, but there have been presidential findings on covert operations in Iran for almost thirty years. Still, the details the administration has decided to make available to The New Yorker via Hersh should make worthwhile reading.
The important point is that unless there has been a massive breach of security, the administration has again acted to increase tensions with Iran — and this just a week after floating the idea of increased diplomatic ties with Iran and about ten days since leaking the report on the Israeli exercises. Since this article has been in preparation for weeks or months, and its publication date has not been under administration control, it remains unclear where in the sequence this leak was intended. But psychological warfare with Iran seems the order of the day, and this article is clearly part of it.
Our read of course might be wrong. Grand juries might be convening as we write and the FBI could be ranging all over D.C. taking statements from everyone with access to covert U.S. plans in Iran. But until that happens, we look at this as another attempt to make the Iranians feel insecure.
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From what I can decipher it
From what I can decipher it seems that G.W. Bush and company have settled on a containment strategy with respect to Iran. However, as Indochina showed, containment works only if the other side is willing to be contained.
Popular narratives notwithstanding, the purpose of US and NATO forces in western Europe was to prevent the resurgence of Germany. With the largest standing and intact modern army in the world, the USSR could overcome a depleted Europe even if reinforced by the States. The only unmanageable obstacle was America's nuclear arsenal. Containment with conventional forces was needed as political cover to harness the Germans and reassure the Europeans.
The Iranians simply will not countenance a US client state being established on its border. And a permanent US presence just undermines the credibility of the Iraqi government. Disruptive forces from without and within just portend an inevitable unraveling. Relations between North and South Vietnam provide a good portrait. While nationalist impulse is absent, the same fierce determination and refusal to acquiesce to American demands is the same.
On the domestic side of the equation, some mandarins of foreign policy also reject containment. The USAF has furtively planned to use nuclear weapons. They called it an accident but this is belied by the unprecedented ouster of both the service Chief and Secretary. Weeks earlier the CINCPAC was quietly removed. Some may think that this is because he was inherently opposed to war with Iran. But if the past is a reasonable guide, it's more likely that he was unwilling to half-step.
In response to submariner
In response to submariner and my earlier post. The atmospherics in the U.S.-Israeli confrontation with Iran changed on Wednesday. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki was quoted by Iran’s official news agency IRNA as saying, “A new trend of change is taking place, and it started with Iran putting forward a new package.” Europe, Russia, China and the United States made an offer to Iran on June 14, as tensions of possible attacks on Iran mounted. The incentive deal offered economic and technological benefits to Iran in return for suspending its uranium enrichment program. Mottaki went on to say that “important issues for talks were mentioned in this package and from the other side the 5+1 group delivered its own offer.”
Javier Solana, head of European foreign policy, had said on June 14 that the joint package and Iran’s position were compatible. This was not taken particularly seriously, since the Europeans’ commitment to a diplomatic, rather than military, path meant that they tended to understate differences. However, with Mottaki saying that “Iran and the 5+1 group’s packages have a good work potential,” we now have the Iranians seeming to sign on to the European position.
The Bush administration was cautious, but not dismissive. White House Press Secretary Dana Perino stated, “We’ll see if they were serious about wanting to take us up on that. That would be welcome, but I think that we have every reason to be skeptical since we get mixed messages from them all the time.” U.S. President George W. Bush commented that he has always said “that all options are on the table, but the first option for the United States is to solve the problem diplomatically.” Given the atmosphere in the past few weeks, this is certainly ratcheting down the atmospherics.
So far, all that has really changed are the atmospherics. However, there does appear to be a substantial shift in the Iranians’ position, implying that they have heard something that might induce them to end their enrichment program. They have said things like this in the past in informal contexts, and then reversed themselves. The United States has not changed its public position — which has always been officially favoring diplomacy but being prepared for military action.
Normally, we are not big on atmospherics. This could certainly be an attempt by the Iranians to forestall an attack and split the major powers that have been bought together in order to forestall an attack. Under the circumstances, an Israeli attack on Iran, for example, would carry a high political cost, seeming to torpedo a promising peace initiative for no good reason. So, this could simply be an Iranian initiative to buy time.
The fact is, as we have argued, that the Israeli threat is more apparent than real. The difficulties of such an attack — and the consequences to the global economy — make this hard to imagine. The Iranians have been dismissive of the threats, but that might simply be bravado and a means of setting up this initiative.
But a more reasonable explanation, from our point of view, is that the American strategy is working. By simultaneously putting a plausible offer on the table while raising the possibility of military action, the United States moved the negotiation process forward. As they say, you can get more with a smile and a gun than with a smile alone. Certainly, our confidence that the United States and Israel were bluffing does not mean that the Iranians could take that chance. With a decent proposal on the table, and the possibility of losing their nuclear program anyway, they might well have decided to trade it rather than have it vaporized.
The problem remaining, however, is not to work out the precise benefits provided the Iranians. The real issue that Iran wants to deal with is its national security and guarantees of its regional interests, particularly in Iraq. The reason the Iranians wanted nuclear weapons was to secure these things, and if they negotiate it away, it won’t be just for trade and technology. They will want assurances that the Iraqi government will not be an American vassal — that it will be a neutral buffer. The Iranians’ dreams of regional hegemony are fading, but their need to know that they will not face a threat from Iraq in 10 years (especially in light of the terrible war of the 1980s) is a fundamental national interest.
The Iranians have already put a down payment on this by helping restrain Shiite militias. But Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr is becoming restive again — and thereby driving home the Iranian point that the consequences of an attack will be chaos in Iraq.
The Iranians have cards to play. We do take these statements seriously. The United States doesn’t want to attack Iran, and Iran has more important things to worry about than nukes. We have always said this is a bargaining point for Iran, not a core national interest.
Now we will see who is right. The United States and Israel have tried to convince Iran that war is the alternative. The Iranians have said they will negotiate away enriched uranium for the right price. Bush has said that’s what he wanted all along. Now we get down to the real issue: guaranteeing Iranian national security without nukes. That can be done, but it will take Bush — not Solana — to make that deal. This may all fall apart. We certainly expect it to appear to be falling apart as the negotiators position themselves. But, in the end, our bet is still on a deal.
Kennan
As they say, you can get more with a smile and a gun than with a smile alone.
-Anon
Very funny! Your observation is utterly rational and coheres with my own thoughts on the subject. But there is still a fairly wide distance from here to there. For instance, during the Kennedy administration US analysts knew that a unified communist bloc was a mirage. But it was impossible to take advantage of this fact and convert it to policy until the Nixon administration. In the interim, Southeast Asia was deluged in proxy wars and a force like the Khmer Rouge was unleashed.
Like the witch hunts of old, a threat doesn't have to be real in order to be tangible. It will be hard to negotiate with an Iran magnified to the level of a Leviathan. And a settlement absolutely will not occur in the last months of a Bush administration. At most, he can provide a decent springboard for a presumptive Democratic regime.
Omitted from your analysis is the power of nationalists, militarists, and theocrats to affect the outcome. The constellation of interests which you accurately highlight are of secondary importance to their purpose.