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Prometheus 6

All respect and no restraint

Thing is, Ashcroft turned out not to be the worst of the crew

Lee Gelernt, a lawyer for the American Civil Liberties Union who represented Mr. Kidd, called it “an enormous decision” that says “no official, including the attorney general of the United States, can be immune if he adopts and implements an unconstitutional policy.”...

Charles S. Miller, a spokesman for the Justice Department, said, “We’re reviewing the court’s ruling.” Mark Corallo, a spokesman for Mr. Ashcroft, would say only that Mr. Ashcroft was reviewing the decision as well.

A report in 2005 by Human Rights Watch and the A.C.L.U. said that 70 people were improperly detained under the material witness law after 9/11. Although the decision could conceivably apply to those people, few, if any, of them could now sue because of the statute of limitations, Mr. Gelernt said.

Panel Rules Against Ashcroft in Detention Case
By JOHN SCHWARTZ

Former Attorney General John Ashcroft may face personal liability for the decisions that led to the detention of an American citizen as a material witness after the Sept. 11 attacks, a federal appeals court panel ruled on Friday.

In the decision, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in San Francisco, was sharply critical of the Bush administration’s practice of holding people it suspected of terrorism without charges, as material witnesses.

“We find this to be repugnant to the Constitution, and a painful reminder of some of the most ignominious chapters of our national history,” said the opinion, written by Judge Milan D. Smith Jr.

The lawsuit was brought in 2005 by Abdullah al-Kidd, who was born Lavoni T. Kidd in Kansas and converted to Islam in college. He was arrested in 2003 at Dulles Airport as he prepared to fly to Saudi Arabia for graduate work in Islamic studies, and was held for weeks under a law that allows the indefinite detention of material witnesses to a crime. After his detention, he was ordered to stay with his in-laws in Las Vegas; his travel was restricted over the next year.

Mr. Kidd, who was not called as a witness in the case in which he was detained and was never charged with a crime, sued Mr. Ashcroft and other officials in 2005, challenging his detention as unconstitutional and saying it cost him his marriage and his job. His lawyers argued that he was held as part of a secret Bush administration policy to use the material witness statute as a tool to detain and interrogate people when there was insufficient evidence to charge them with a crime.

Abdullah al-Kidd versus John

Abdullah al-Kidd versus John Ashcroft

Excerpt from the 9th Circuit Appeals Court Panel's decision:

 

“Ashcroft’s suggested approach, by contrast, would convert

the Supreme Court’s functional approach into a formalistic

taxonomy of acts that are inherently either prosecutorial or

investigative, regardless of what each act is really serving to

accomplish. Because the application for the arrest warrant had

the words “Material Witness” in the caption, Ashcroft seems

to contend, our inquiry must stop there. Our dissenting colleague

agrees, and would hold that so long as a material witness

warrant is sought pursuant to a criminal trial, the

decision to seek the material witness warrant should always

be shielded by absolute immunity, regardless of whether its

purpose was purely investigative. Dissent at 12351.

 

“We disagree. Many tools and tactics available to prosecutors

can serve either an investigatory or advocacy-related

function. A grand jury may be used to return an indictment

against a particular suspect, or to conduct a wide-ranging

investigation. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274. A witness interview’s

function may be to gather evidence, or to prepare the witness

to testify at imminent trial. Genzler, 410 F.3d at 638. And the

power to arrest, even as a material witness, can be investigatory.

As cited in al-Kidd’s complaint, Michael Chertoff, then

Assistant Attorney General for the DOJ’s Criminal Division,

described the material witness statute as “an important investi-

gative tool in the war on terrorism . . . . Bear in mind that you

get not only testimony—you get fingerprints, you get hair

samples—so there’s all kinds of evidence you can get from a

witness.” Steve Fainaru & Margot Williams, Material Witness

Law Has Many in Limbo: Nearly Half Held in War On Terror

Haven’t Testified, Wash. Post, Nov. 24, 2002, at A1 (quoting

Chertoff) (emphasis added).

 

“Ashcroft argues that an inquiry into purpose cannot be cabined:

a prosecutor filing charges against a foot soldier in an

organized crime syndicate, for example, might hope that the

prospect of a lengthy incarceration will encourage the defendant

to turn state’s evidence, permitting investigation of those

higher in the organization. A wide-ranging investigation into

such motives would likely prove unworkable. It is for that

reason that the Supreme Court has spoken only of “immediate

purpose.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 275 (emphasis added). As a

common law court, we can rule only on the case before us.

We believe, however, that while the prosecutor who files

charges may hope, eventually, that the petty crook will implicate

his boss, the immediate purpose of filing charges is to

begin a prosecution—the better to pressure the defendant into

providing information.”


 

 

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